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Eco-Apocalypse
Environmentalism, Political Alienation, and
Therapeutic Agency
Philip Hammond and Hugh Ortega Breton
If apocalypse is an event the script of which is already written, in what sense
do human beings participate in apocalypse?1
For some analysts, today’s representations of apocalypse are simply the latest
version of a “pervasive sense of doom” that has characterized human civil-
ization for millennia.2 For others, in the context of current environmental
problems, a sense of impending disaster expresses a scientifically supported
assessment of today’s “risk society.” Anthony Giddens argues that
“[d]oomsday is no longer a religious concept, a day of spiritual reckoning,
but a possibility imminent in our society and economy.”3 Our argument is
that the current fascination with the end of the world is best understood
neither as a near-timeless feature of human culture nor as a reasoned re-
sponse to objective environmental problems. Rather it is driven by uncon-
scious fantasy; the symbolic expression of an alienation from political sub-
jectivity, characteristic of a historically specific period in the life of
post–Cold War societies. With the script of the real apocalypse already writ-
ten through scientific projections, how do environmental discourse and popu-
lar culture represent people? We will first consider recent critiques of the use
of apocalypticism in environmental discourse, then examine elite uses of
eco-apocalypse in political discourse, and finally discuss two films that en-
visage a world destroyed by catastrophic climate change: The Day After
Tomorrow (2004) and The Age of Stupid (2009).
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ENVIRONMENTAL APOCAPHILIA AND ITS CRITICS
Apocalyptic thinking is seen as useful by some environmentalists4 but is also
often viewed as problematic for various reasons. Sometimes it is rejected
simply because it is inaccurate, as in Ian Lovelock’s acknowledgment that he
was too alarmist about “Gaia’s revenge.”5 More often what the Institute for
Public Policy Research (IPPR) think tank describes as an “alarmist reper-
toire,” characterized by an “inflated or extreme lexicon,” an “urgent tone and
cinematic codes,” and a “quasi-religious register of death and doom,” is seen
as ineffective or even counterproductive since it offers only a “counsel of
despair.”6 This is not to say, of course, that apocalyptic constructions of
climate change no longer feature prominently in public discourse: as the
IPPR suggests, the “sensationalism and connection with the unreality of Hol-
lywood films” that such apocalypticism involves may be “secretly thrilling,”
a form of “climate porn.”7 Unlike religious conceptions of apocalypse, the
environmentalist version involves no moment of transcendence or redemp-
tion. Pascal Bruckner argues:
The Christian Apocalypse presented itself as a revelation, a passage in to
another temporal order, whereas this apocalypse reveals nothing, it issues the
final judgment: pure apocalypse. No promise of redemption, just an ideal for
survivors, an “epidemic of remorse.”8
Similarly, contrasting the Judeo-Christian tradition with what he calls the
“Hollywood-informed formula” of eco-apocalypse, Mark Levene notes that
the latter “provides an uncanny reflection of the workings of our ‘normative’
Western state and societal organization.”[AQ: Please provide a page num-
ber for this quote.] While some (scientific) elite may be cast as saviors, “the
role available to the majority of humanity is nothing more than as passive
onlookers.”9 The apocalypse ushers in nondemocratic social transformation.
In this sense, as Erik Swyngedouw argues, environmentalism can be
understood as postpolitical, reinforcing “processes of depoliticization and the
socio-political status quo.”10 Rather than offering any historic transformation
or metaphysical salvation, environmental apocalypticism is “an expression of
the current post-political and post-democratic condition,” in which “ideologi-
cal or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-manageri-
al planning, expert management and administration.”11 One might think of
the way that international climate summits purport to decide “the future we
want,”12 outside of any democratic debate about or mechanism of account-
ability for that future, as confirming the accuracy of this account. An antipa-
thy to what Swyngedouw calls “the properly political”13 is not an accidental
or superficial aspect of contemporary environmentalism: in its insistence that
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the future human society must be guided by (the science of) climate change,
it perforce closes off any space for democratic debate or disagreement.
In characterizing environmentalism as a “new opium for the masses,”
Swyngedouw draws on the work of Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou, both of
whom make the same point.14 Yet a very similar argument was made more
than thirty years previously by Jean Baudrillard, who argued in 1970 that
environmentalism was “a new ‘opium of the people’.”15 Baudrillard put
forward a traditionally Marxist ideology-critique in which he compared envi-
ronmentalism to a “witch-hunt” in that it attempted to unite antagonistic
social classes in a “new crusade” against a mystified threat by “shouting
apocalypse.” “Nothing better than a touch of ecology and catastrophe to unite
the social classes,” he remarked caustically.[AQ: Please provide a source/
page number for this quote.] It is a powerful critique—perhaps even more
compelling than more recent iterations of the argument. Yet it no longer
seems accurate to think of visions of eco-apocalypse as papering over politi-
cal divisions that threaten to burst through at any moment, nor to think of this
as an elite strategy to silence dissent and suppress demands for social change
(as sometimes implied by Swyngedouw and Žižek).
Whereas Baudrillard was probably correct, in 1970, to argue that environ-
mentalism was a “therapeutic mythology” that masked real “social contradic-
tions,” we claim that today environmentalism draws on an individuated,
therapeutic ethos to provide a “solution” for the loss of modernist political
agency. Since the end of the Cold War, Western societies have increasingly
made use of therapeutically derived understandings of the self in order to
understand and communicate with each other,16 giving expression to Pascal
Bruckner’s “epidemic of remorse.” For example, the psycho-social scholar
Paul Hoggett identifies redemptive and survivalist variants to apocalyptic
narrative, which he claims are different manic attempts for fending off de-
spair, manifested in the split and simplified polarization of the two opposing
sides in the environmentalist debate.17 In making this argument, we seek to
highlight the profound changes that are entailed in the collapse of modernist
left/right politics at the end of the 1980s.18 In particular, the absence of this
long-established political framework has led to the future being viewed with
uncertainty and fear since there is no readily available structure of meaning
through which to make sense of change. It provides fertile ground for a
discourse of fear19 or risk consciousness.20 Shaped by this discourse, envi-
ronmentalism provides a potential magical “solution” to the problem of co-
hering a constituency in the present for elite and other political actors by
therapeutically speaking on behalf of future generations and nonhuman na-
ture as being at risk from catastrophic harm. In these circumstances, it is not
so much that an ideology holds back some latent movement for collective
social change but rather that we are deeply alienated from our own political
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agency, the sphere of action limited to intra- and interpersonal relations and
survival.
As a response, eco-apocalypse first offers a sense of purpose or mission in
the absence of political visions of the future and second, provides a fetish for
the loss of modernist political subjectivity. The following sections elaborate
each of these claims first with an illustration of how mainstream political
leaders have attempted to use the scientific projection of environmental ca-
tastrophe and second, with a discussion of apocalyptic cinematic narratives
that use therapeutic discourse.
POSTPOLITICAL GREEN MEANING
The official film made to publicize the 2009 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen provides a telling illustration of the way that
elites view themselves in relation to the issue of climate change. 21 Produced
by the Danish Foreign Ministry and screened at the opening of the summit,
the video depicts a nightmare scenario of environmental apocalypse: it fea-
tures a young girl having a bad dream about the cataclysmic destruction of an
apparently depopulated earth in a rapid series of natural disasters—drought
and desertification, earthquake, tornado, and flooding. Her nightmare is in-
duced by watching television news stories about the impacts of climate
change before she goes to bed. After she wakes up screaming in terror, she
relates the dream to her father, who comforts her by going online and show-
ing her the official Copenhagen summit website, which offers reassurance
that international leaders are aware of the problem. Inspired by the site, the
girl borrows her father’s camcorder and runs up to the roof of their apartment
building, where she films herself saying, “Please help the world.” The
phrase, which is also the title of the film, is then reiterated by other children
from around the world, their successive images zooming away to form the
summit’s globe logo, accompanied by the slogan “We have the power to save
the world. Now.” The video provides a striking insight into the official mind-
set: what appears, at first glance, to be a campaigning film about people
putting pressure on world leaders is really an elite wish-fulfillment fantasy in
which child-citizens across the globe put their faith in parent-politicians en-
gaged in an heroic, planet-saving mission. While activists are apt to think of
themselves as taking a principled stand and putting pressure on compromised
politicians, leaders actually seem delighted by the authority that such “pres-
sure” bestows on them. If public pressure is not forthcoming, they go out of
their way to encourage and, if necessary, to simulate it through popular
culture and the medium of film.
Political elites have seized upon climate change as an issue around which
they can create the appearance of purposeful activity and meaningfulness. In
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the months before the Copenhagen summit, the British government at-
tempted to represent itself as some sort of activist organization, launching the
“Act on Copenhagen” campaign, which urged “Pledge your support for an
ambitious global deal here!” because “We need your backing to help us
negotiate.”22 Behaving as if it were its own pressure group, the government
urged the public to urge them to act. At the same time, it also berated its
citizens for their apathy. Worrying that “there isn’t yet that feeling of urgen-
cy and drive and animation about the Copenhagen conference,” for example,
David Miliband complained that “the penny hasn’t dropped that this climate
change challenge is real and is happening now.”23 Miliband was speaking at
the October 2009 launch of the Science Museum’s “Prove It!” exhibition—
another ersatz “campaign,” this time inviting people to sign up to the state-
ment “I want the government to prove they’re serious about climate change
by negotiating a strong, effective, fair deal at Copenhagen.” Yet according to
the museum’s director, the exhibition was created in direct response to a
briefing from the government’s Department of Energy and Climate Change
when “we realized that public interest had flattened out and yet here we were
approaching the most historic negotiations in human history.”24 In other
words, it was official concern about a lack of public interest that produced a
campaign in which the public would be encouraged to put pressure on offi-
cials.
Such is the relationship between the elite and the electorate today: they
urge us to be less apathetic and to urge them to act. The reason for this
strange simulation of a political relationship is that environmental activism
provides a vocabulary through which leaders can articulate a sense of pur-
pose and meaning that is otherwise signally absent from today’s narrow and
trivial political discourse. President Barack Obama, for example, claimed to
have “renewed American leadership” at Copenhagen. Hailing the accord that
he negotiated as a “meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough,” he said
that the summit marked “the beginning of a new era of international ac-
tion.”25 In advance of the summit, the language was even more grandiose as
leaders imagined how they would “change the course of history” by negotiat-
ing a reduction in carbon emissions.26 It seems unlikely that, in the long run,
the elite’s search for meaning in green politics will be successful. The vision
it offers—of urgent regulation—is a largely negative, dystopian one, charac-
teristic of a demoralized society for which, as one climate campaigner puts it,
“the age of heroism is over.”27 While the elite may continue to campaign and
cajole the public about the climate, they do so precisely because of their
inability to engage people in a nonapocalyptic, forward-looking project.
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THE CINEMATIC ECO-APOCALYPSE
Yet if the narrative of eco-apocalypse seems limited as a directly political
resource, its continuing cinematic reiteration suggests that it has considerable
popular cultural resonance. Indeed, we would suggest that cinematic eco-
apocalypse is appealing to the contemporary imagination partly because it is
antipolitical, allowing the frustrations and difficulties of political engage-
ment to be swept aside. More precisely, in both The Day After Tomorrow and
The Age of Stupid, we identify three themes: first, the sphere of conventional,
formal politics is rejected as dysfunctional and/or negative; second, large-
scale transformative agency is disavowed and instead projected into nature;
and third, as a consequence, human “agency” is reduced to individualized,
small-scale actions that are therapeutic in character.
One of the basic insights of modern left-wing politics was that the prob-
lems facing humanity were social rather than natural in origin and that they
could, therefore, potentially be resolved through collective social action.
With large-scale social change off the political agenda in Western societies
for the time being, it is much harder to hold on to the insight that our
problems are social in origin and solution. Political agency is now very
narrowly associated with governments and disconnected politicians, who are
represented negatively in both films. The Age of Stupid offers reductive
caricatures of politics and economics, for example, in a short animated se-
quence that presents the history of modernity as a series of failed “-isms”
ending with “consumerism.” Political agency is also represented in the at-
tempts of one individual to gain permission from his local council to build a
wind farm. His anger and frustration with the political system is clear when
his proposal is rejected through the actions of an organized group of “NIM-
BY” (not in my backyard) residents.
In The Day After Tomorrow, a negative portrayal of formal political agen-
cy is embodied in the dismissive and belligerent Vice President Becker (a
character clearly modeled on the unpopular Dick Cheney). The vice presi-
dent refuses to listen to the scientific evidence presented by the film’s hero
until it is too late to act. Catastrophic weather events destroy not only the
physical human environment but also the prevailing social order: survivors of
the US administration take refuge in Mexico. By the end of the film, a
humbled and penitent vice president is forced to admit that he was wrong
and, by extension, that the whole social order he represents was flawed,
mistakenly believing that it could use nature’s resources without conse-
quences.
In both The Day After Tomorrow and The Age of Stupid, then, there is a
clear sense that the destruction is deserved as a kind of punishment for past
sins or stupidities. As John Walliss and James Aston observe, this is charac-
teristic of the kind of “social commentary” found in several apocalyptic
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films—other examples include Children of Men (2006), The Day the Earth
Stood Still (2008), and Knowing (2009)—whereby the existing sociopolitical
order is simply wiped out in order to allow a fresh start, and any hope for the
future is vested in the innocence of childhood as against the corrupt adult
world.28 Alienated from a political agency characterized as wholly negative,
subjectivity is projected into nature so that the climate (spectacularly repre-
sented in line with the worst-case scenario scientific projection), rather than
collective humanity, becomes the active agent of change. Something similar
might be said of environmentalist politics, which suffers from “climate re-
ductionism,” whereby we give up the future to natural forces rather than
understanding it as something that is potentially within human control:
[Climate reductionism] is nurtured by elements of a Western cultural pessi-
mism which promote the pathologies of vulnerability, fatalism and fear. . . . By
handing the future over to inexorable non-human powers, climate reduction-
ism offers a rationalization, even if a poor one, of the West’s loss of confi-
dence in the future.29
Projecting social agency into nature not only represents human agency in an
alienated and so diminished form, it is also politically counterproductive
because natural change is represented (through the use of computer-generat-
ed imagery [CGI] and camera angles) on a vastly larger scale than historical,
human actions; a scale that cannot, currently, be matched. Agency becomes
an uncontrollable, destructive capacity, while humanity, alienated from insti-
tutional political agency, is reduced to a passive, at-risk, victim subjectivity.
Rather than simply an absence of redemption or salvation, it would be
more accurate to say that environmental apocalyptic narratives offer a kind of
“pseudo redemption”: there is a sense of individuated, small-scale, therapeu-
tic redemption to be achieved through reparative actions in response to loss
as individuals react to the power of nature. For example, the climate-scientist
protagonist in The Day After Tomorrow, having failed in his attempts to
persuade the authorities of the impending crisis, instead wages a different
struggle. Battling against the elements, he goes on a quest to rescue his
estranged teenage son, who is stranded with a small band of survivors in New
York. While massive forces of natural destruction effect large-scale social
transformation, human action is confined to mending broken interpersonal
relationships. Similarly, in the semidocumentary film The Age of Stupid, the
focus is on the real-life characters’ disclosure of a range of events, directly or
indirectly attributable to climate change, that have caused personal loss, pain,
and suffering. The audience is first shown the imagined effects of apocalyp-
tic climate change on iconic tourist sites that represent human civilization,
and selected news footage shows the destruction caused by adverse weather
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conditions. This provides the context for a personalized exploration into
human loss.
It might be assumed that this focus on the interpersonal derives from
genre conventions—the need for human-interest drama in a Hollywood dis-
aster movie like The Day After Tomorrow and for compelling personal sto-
ries in a hybrid drama-documentary such as The Age of Stupid. Yet, interest-
ingly, the same therapeutic framework can be found in Al Gore’s campaign-
ing documentary An Inconvenient Truth (2006), suggesting that this focus on
personal relationships, losses, and regrets may have a deeper connection with
environmentalist discourse. As Gore intersperses his scientific exposition
with childhood reminiscences, stories of past personal setbacks, and emotive
accounts of the loss of his sister and the near death of his son, it becomes
clear that the form of change that is called for is a moral and personal one. In
all three films, protagonists draw on emotionally difficult personal experi-
ences as an interpretive framework for changing their behavior. Insofar as
there is a “revelation” (the original, Greek meaning of “apocalypse”), it
derives from self-reflection and remembrance of past losses; and insofar as
people exercise agency, it is understood as reparative, making good the pain-
ful experiences of the past. This therapeutic rendering of the apocalypse
reaches its zenith with the “psycho-apocalypse” films of 2011 (such as Mel-
ancholia), where no survivors remain and the apocalypse is desired as a
release from a troubling world.30 The therapeutic rendering of apocalypse
gives rise to a sublime fascination with psychological suffering with environ-
mental destruction as its context. Through this the frustrations of societal
relatedness and political engagement are negated or revenged.
THERAPEUTIC APOCALYPTICISM
As both Swyngedouw and we argue, visions of eco-apocalypse are sympto-
matic of and also reinforce a “postpolitical” outlook in which the urgency of
impending climate catastrophe closes down democratic debate about possible
futures. Although elites may sometimes invoke the threat of eco-apocalypse
as offering a meaningful framework for political engagement, this does not
so far appear to have been very effective. Instead, as we have argued, the
result is a kind of pseudopolitics, a simulated form of activism through film
in which unenthusiastic citizens are harangued by political leaders attempting
to establish some point of connection with the public. Cinematic versions of
eco-apocalypticism perhaps help to explain why it seems to be of limited use
as a political resource for elites. Although such films often have a more or
less overt campaigning tone and intent, they also tend to be dismissive of
current political processes and institutions, and it may be that part of their
popular appeal lies precisely in their antipolitical outlook. If audiences enjoy
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imagining the current sociopolitical order being cut down or even entirely
obliterated, this seems to speak to a fundamentally antipolitical sentiment
rather than offering any basis for renewed political engagement.
Ultimately, though, it is not the apocalyptic event itself that is most sali-
ent about these films but how human experience and agency are now formu-
lated in relation to it, through a therapeutic ethos. These apocalyptic narra-
tives represent an ethically compelling response, by drawing on therapeutic
culture to represent subjectivity, which is reduced to a therapeutic considera-
tion of how people should conduct themselves in relation to the environment
and their loved ones. In the eco-therapeutic apocalypse, nature is malevolent,
coming back at us in a paranoid31 and alienated form, compelling a process
of psychological change. Knowing that the apocalypse is imminent generates
a fear of loss, producing guilt and regret about one’s personal actions, which
becomes the driving force for reparative actions.
Therapeutic-apocalyptic narratives symbolize an alienated relationship to
history: there are no political choices in intra- and interpersonal relationships,
only emotional and ethical ones. This is why we argue that eco-therapeutic
apocalyptic narratives give indirect expression to the loss of modernist politi-
cal subjectivity. If we are to overcome our current failure of historical imagi-
nation, it does us little good to assume that ready-made political constituen-
cies are waiting in the wings, held back by a depoliticizing environmental-
ism. Rather we will need to address directly the failure of modernist politics
and confront the disavowal of recent socioeconomic and political experience.
Doing so may better enable us to understand the state of contemporary poli-
tics and entertainment media culture and to create a space for imagining
nonapocalyptic, human futures.
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